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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in a particularly uncertain situation as to
how to dispose of spent nuclear fuel, which is highly radioactive
waste that is now being held at various facilities across the country.
For over two decades, U.S. nuclear waste policy rested on the
development of a long-term geologic burial site in Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. However, the Yucca Mountain waste management program
was suspended indefinitely in 2010. The United States is now “back
to the drawing board” in the sense that it lacks a long-term solution
for the safe disposal of nuclear waste.
The agency responsible for licensing nuclear facilities, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), is now in a difficult
position. Recently, in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated two NRC rulings that
enabled the agency to issue operating licenses to nuclear facilities.
The court held that the NRC’s rulings improperly conclude that
permanent storage of nuclear waste will become available “when
necessary,” which is an insufficient evaluation under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 2
In response, the NRC
announced a freeze on all licensing and renewals of licenses until it
addresses the court’s ruling.
This comment will explain why the federal nuclear waste
management program is at a standstill and will suggest a course of
action for the NRC to help revive the program. Part II describes the
environmental hazards of spent nuclear fuel and the federal
government’s effort to site and build a geologic repository for this
nuclear waste. Part III explains the role of the NRC in the nuclear
regulatory scheme and how safety and environmental regulations are
promulgated and enforced. Part IV narrows in on the NRC
rulemakings called the “Waste Confidence Decision” and

*Emily Casey is a third-year law student at Pepperdine University School
of Law. Her interest in this topic was sparked growing up in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and listening to the debate surrounding the Yucca Mountain Repository Program.
1

New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir.

2012).
2

Id. at 478.
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“Temporary Storage Rule,” and the reasons why they were defeated
in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In Part V, I propose
that the NRC make significant changes to these “waste confidence”
rulings to ensure compliance with NEPA.
Political failures have demonstrated that the NRC can no
longer presume the opening of a permanent geologic repository
within a reasonable time frame. In the absence of a repository, the
NRC should amend the rulings to consider other interim options,
namely consolidation of above-ground storage sites.
By
incorporating these changes, the NRC will acknowledge the current
reality of nuclear waste policy, promote practical strategies that are
likely to be pursued given this reality, and thus offer a better
environmental evaluation under NEPA.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
It may come as a surprise to learn that roughly twenty percent
of the nation’s electricity is generated by nuclear energy. 3 Nuclear
power production has increased over the last decade, 4 surpassing
electricity generation from all other sources but coal, which produces
roughly half of the electricity in the United States. 5 Nuclear energy
is a leading option for the future, namely because it is produced
domestically, reduces national fossil fuel dependency, and is one of
the least expensive forms of energy. 6 Relative to other sources of
3

BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT
SECRETARY OF ENERGY 14 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter BRC REPORT],
available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620220235/http://brc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
4
See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW
2011
273,
Table
9.2
(Sept.
2012),
available
at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. Although no new nuclear
power plants have begun construction since 1978, existing nuclear plants have
increased capacity. Id. Nuclear plants are now operating at an average of ninety
percent capacity, whereas in the 1990s they were averaging seventy-five percent
and in the 1980s they were averaging sixty percent. Id.
5
Roger H. Bezdek, Nuclear Power Prospects in the USA: The Continuing
Problem of the Waste Issue, 20 ENERGY & ENV’T 375, 375 (2009).
6
Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: The Future of Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP. J.
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 233 (2010). Nuclear energy is the lowest cost
producer of baseload electricity per kilowatt-hour, costing an average of 2 cents per
TO THE
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electricity, nuclear energy generates drastically lower carbon
emissions and other criteria pollutants. 7 Regardless of the debates as
to whether the commercial nuclear energy sector will or even should
expand, the reality is that there are 104 nuclear reactors currently
operating in the United States, and these reactors produce an
aggregate total of 2,000 to 2,400 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel per
year. 8 Accumulation of nuclear waste remains a glaring concern.
Safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel has proven to be both a scientific
and political challenge. The public must feel uneasy, if not seriously
disturbed, at the status of nuclear waste policy in the United States,
given that it currently has no long-term solution whatsoever for the
disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste.

kilowatt-hour. Nuclear Energy: Just the Facts, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., 17
(2010),
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy
/brochures/justthefacts. Because only a quarter of its production costs are
attributed to fuel costs, nuclear power is relatively unaffected by the price
fluctuations that drive the costs of fossil-fuel energy, and thus nuclear power has
remarkable forward price stability. Id.
7
Justin Gundlach, What’s the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant? The
Answer’s Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New
Power Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 605 (2010). The nuclear lifecycle yields
a small volume of greenhouse gases, close to that of wind power. Id. (citing M.V.
Ramana, Nuclear Power: Economic, Safety, Health, and Environmental Issues of
Near-Term Technologies, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES, 127, 144 (2009)).
In the year 2011, nuclear-generated electricity diverted 613 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide. This is roughly equivalent to the amount of carbon dioxide
“released from 110 million cars, which is nearly all U.S. passenger cars.” See
ENERGY
INST.,
Environment:
Emissions
Prevented,
NUCLEAR
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/environmentemissionspreve
nted/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
8
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. Most nuclear power plants are fueled
by enriched uranium oxide. Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in
the United States and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 472 (2010). The enriched uranium oxide is suspended in
zirconium alloy tubes about three or four meters in length called fuel rods. Id.
Several hundred fuel rods are bundled together to form assemblies within one
reactor. Id. As the reactor operates, the uranium-235 atoms are split into lighter
elements. Id. After three or four years, the concentration of uranium-235
decreases such that the nuclear reactor must be shut down and replaced with new
fuel. Id. These depleted fuel rod assemblies are referred to as “spent nuclear fuel.”
Id.
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Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is composed of highly radioactive
nuclear byproducts, some of which have half-lives spanning
thousands of years. 9 It also emits thermal heat, making it very
dangerous to handle when it comes out of the reactor.10
Consequently, SNF is first kept in temporary storage to cool before it
is moved to another site. 11 Shortly after it is removed from the
reactor, SNF is stored in on-site containment pools of circulating
water. 12 The water cools the SNF and defrays some of the
radiation. 13 After an average of five years in the pool, the SNF can
be moved to another facility for further processing, temporary
storage, or permanent disposal. 14
In the absence of a permanent storage facility, nuclear
facilities are compensating by keeping SNF at on-site storage units
even after they have completed the cooling process. Some plants
have adopted dry cask storage, whereby SNF is inserted into a
container made of concrete and steel, filled with inert gas, and bolted
and welded shut. 15 Dry cask storage is the safest and most preferred
storage option, but also more expensive. 16 In studies, the casks have
persisted against airplane crashes, explosives, and rounds fired at the

9

See de Saillan, supra note 8, at 472–73. A “half-life” is the amount of
time it takes for fifty percent of the atoms in a radioactive isotope to decay. Id. at
472 n.74.
10
Id. at 472.
11
Id. at 473.
12
Id. at 474.
13
Id.
14
“Disposal” and “storage” have different meanings in the context of
nuclear waste. Disposal is the final, long-term stage of waste management that
relies “only on the passive operation of natural environmental and man-made
barriers.” BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xi. Disposal refers to geologic burial with
the purpose of isolating the nuclear waste from human contact for tens of thousands
of years. See NEA Issue Brief: No. 3, The Disposal of High-Level Radioactive
Waste, NEA (Jan. 1989), http://www.oecd-nea.org/brief/brief-03.html. In contrast,
“storage” is an interim period in waste management. BRC REPORT, supra note 3,
at xi. Storage involves managed access to the waste with “active human control
and maintenance” so that the waste is still retrievable. Id. Nuclear waste in storage
is subject to later disposal. Id.
15
de Saillan, supra note 8, at 474.
16
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 34.
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exterior armor. 17 The casks are designed for dual purposes of interim
storage and transport, although only a small percentage of SNF has
been relocated to off-site facilities. About 15,000 metric tons of
commercial SNF have been converted to the dry cask storage form. 18
The aggregate amount of SNF and high-level waste (HLW) in
the United States is over 70,000 metric tons. 19 Nearly all of the
existing SNF is stored at the reactor sites where it was generated,
including sites that have been shut down. 20 About three-quarters of
the SNF remains in its original cooling containment pools. 21 Some
nuclear reactors are now storing up to five times as much SNF in
their containment pools as was initially subscribed by their operating
licenses. 22 Packing more SNF assemblies into these pools impairs
the circulation of water and increases the risk of fire. 23
A. Federal Administrative Responsibility of Nuclear Disposal
As a result of these pronounced dangers, nuclear development
is highly regulated by the federal government. The Energy
Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974 established the regulatory system
that closest resembles the structure in place today. 24 The ERA of
1974 eliminated the Atomic Energy Commission, which was once
the sole, centralized agency for all nuclear development, and divided
its functions into two new agencies. 25 First, it designated the
responsibility of licensing and regulation of commercial nuclear
facilities to the NRC. 26 The second agency, which ultimately
evolved into the Department of Energy (DOE), was charged with
17

Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a
Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 805 (2010).
18
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
19
Stewart, supra note 17, at 787. High-level waste is spent nuclear fuel
that has been reprocessed, but is still highly radioactive. Id. at 786. To put this in
context, 70,000 metric tons of SNF and HLW would fill one football field to a
height of over than 20 feet. See BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
20
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
21
Id.
22
de Saillan, supra note 8, at 478.
23
Id.
24
Stewart, supra note 17, at 789.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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development of nuclear weapons and promotion of nuclear energy. 27
In short, the NRC holds regulatory power over civilian nuclear
facilities, while the DOE operates defense nuclear facilities. 28
In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, Congress
assumed responsibility for permanent disposal of SNF and HLW, and
chose geologic burial as the method of disposal. 29 The NWPA
charged the DOE with the overall task of developing a permanent
federal repository for commercial waste. 30 To pay for the repository,
the NWPA established the Nuclear Waste Fund, which collects fees
calculated by the amount of kilowatts of electricity produced from
commercial nuclear facilities.31 The NWPA created a Standard
27

Id.
Id.
29
Geologic burial was not always the clear choice for nuclear waste
disposal. In the initial stages, scientists suggested waste storage in remote and
desolate areas, such as Antarctica or space. Karen Breslin, Radio-Free America:
What to Do with the Waste, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 832 (1994). These
options were abandoned due to exorbitant costs and the risk of catastrophic failure.
Id. Another suggestion was burial deep within sediments in the seabed. This, too,
would be expensive, difficult to retrieve, and potentially violate international ocean
dumping laws. Id. Another alternative is long-term storage in above-ground units,
allowing for more flexibility and easier retrieval. Above-ground storage would rely
on human institutions to control and monitor the waste for an indefinite period of
time. Id. at 833. The United States is not considering this as a long-term strategy,
although NGOs have proposed it. Id. Geologic burial is the option currently in the
lead in the United States and most nuclear countries. See also Jane C.S. Long &
Rodney C. Ewing, Yucca Mountain: Earth-Science Issues at a Geologic Repository
for High-Level Nuclear Waste, 32 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 363,
368 (2004).
30
42 U.S.C. § 10132(a) (2012). The DOE currently operates a geologic
repository for defense-generated transuranic radioactive waste called the Waste
Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). D.D. TRENT, ET. AL., GEOLOGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 539 (6th ed. 2010). WIPP is the nation’s first underground nuclear
waste repository, located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, and has been operating
successfully since 1999. Id. WIPP is unrelated to the NWPA and its federal
repository program for commercial nuclear waste.
31
42 U.S.C. § 10222 (2012). The fees yield approximately $750 million
per year, and the total unspent balance of the Fund is $27 billion. BRC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 72. The Fund was created for the “sole purpose” of ensuring that
the repository program would not have to compete with other federal programs for
funding. Id. at xi. However, subsequent congressional and executive actions have
defeated this purpose and effectively rendered the Nuclear Waste Fund unavailable.
Id. at 72–73. Now, nuclear waste programs are paid through yearly appropriations
28

730

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

Contract that obligates the DOE to dispose of SNF and HLW in
return for payment by nuclear utilities companies. The Contract’s
terms specified that the DOE shall take title to all commercial SNF
and open a permanent repository by 1998. 32 In addition to outlining
a permanent repository program, the NWPA also authorized the DOE
to research and design a site for “monitored retrievable storage”
(MRS) where SNF could be stored for a longer term prior to burial. 33
The NWPA sought to establish a fair process for selecting a
repository location to prevent the perception that a particular state
would have to bear the burden of the nation’s total nuclear waste. 34
To further this purpose, Congress expressly limited the capacity of
the first repository to hold only 70,000 metric tons of waste until a
second repository opened. 35
B. Political and Technical Obstacles in Finding a Permanent
Repository
Pursuant to the NWPA, the DOE published a set of
guidelines, or site-suitability criteria, to be used to objectively
evaluate potential sites. 36 The site suitability factors included
consideration of “hydrology, geophysics, seismic activity, . . .
proximity to water supplies, proximity to populations, . . . proximity
to sites where high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is
from the Treasury and “therefore subject to exactly the budget constraints and
uncertainties that the Fund was created to avoid.” Id. at xi. Thus, the U.S.
government has incurred a significant liability to the nuclear utilities companies,
while the appropriations process has “clearly proven to be a poor mechanism for
financing a very long-term and complex effort.” Id. at 74; see also Stewart, supra
note 17, at 799.
32
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 646. The 1998 deadline was not met. As a
result, seventy-eight lawsuits have commenced, some of which have settled, and
others have resulted in judgments that found the DOE in “partial breach” of the
Standard Contract. BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 79. The DOE predicts that the
total damage awards to nuclear utilities companies could reach $20 billion even if
the federal government were to begin accepting nuclear waste in 2020. Id.
33
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
34
Id. at 20. The Act originally called for the selection of two repository
sites, with the assumption that one would be located in the east and the other in the
west. Id. at 20–21.
35
Stewart, supra note 17, at 794.
36
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
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generated or temporarily stored and the transportation and safety
factors involved in moving such waste to a repository.” 37 Despite its
primarily scientific objective, the DOE faced social and political
hurdles in attempting to nominate sites for nuclear waste storage. 38
The DOE identified three potential sites for an MRS facility, all
located in Tennessee, but met with harsh political opposition in the
state. 39 The DOE suggested nine sites for a permanent geologic
repository, including sites in Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Washington, and Nevada. 40 Subsequently, in 1982 the DOE
narrowed the list and submitted three sites to President Reagan as
candidates for site characterization, ranking Yucca Mountain in Nye
County, Nevada, first among them. 41 In 1986, the Secretary of
Energy announced that the DOE had suspended its efforts to look for
a second geologic repository. 42 Due to the NWPA’s climbing costs
and unmet deadlines, Congress amended the Act in 1987 to cancel all
ongoing research for a second repository program or MRS site, and
instead specifically directed the licensing and development of a
single repository at Yucca Mountain. 43
Yucca Mountain is one of the most extensively studied cases
for nuclear waste disposal, with federal investment totaling
approximately fifteen billion dollars. 44
The DOE performed

37

42 U.S.C. § 10132(a) (2012). The DOE’s final site sustainability rules
required that “engineered barriers shall not be used to compensate for an
inadequate site; mask the innate deficiencies of a site; disguise the strengths and
weaknesses of a site . . . and mask differences between sites when they are
compared.” 10 C.F.R. § 960.3-1-5 (1984). Thus, the goal of this process was to
locate a site with sound natural geologic barriers rather than creating one artificially
through a massive engineering feat.
38
Stewart, supra note 17, at 795.
39
Id. at 798.
40
Id. at 795.
41
Id. The DOE also recommended the Hanford site in Washington and a
site in Deaf Smith County, Texas. Id. at 795.
42
Id. at 796 n.35.
43
Id. at 795. The decision was criticized for its political implications. It
produced strong opposition in Nevada, a state with no commercial nuclear
facilities, and came to be known as the “Screw Nevada” bill. BRC REPORT, supra
note 3, at 22.
44
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, G.A.O. 11-229, COMMERCIAL
NUCLEAR WASTE: EFFECTS OF A TERMINATION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN
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thorough site characterization studies throughout the 1990s and
published an official finding of the site’s suitability in 2002. 45 Yucca
Mountain has several ideal characteristics: a very arid climate, layers
of volcanic tuff that further reduce moisture, and rock beds that
contain minerals called zeolites that slowly absorb radionuclides. 46
The DOE intensively studied the groundwater paths in Yucca
Mountain, and estimated that any flow of radioactive material would
be minimal and at a very slow rate. 47 However, local opposition to
the project remained high, especially as other technical problems
with the site were pointed out. 48 The state of Nevada submitted a
“Notice of Disapproval,” essentially a veto, provided under the
NWPA. 49 However, in 2002, Congress issued a resolution to
REPOSITORY PROGRAM AND LESSONS LEARNED 27 (2011) [hereinafter G.A.O. 11229].
45
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
46
David Applegate, The Mountain Matters, in UNCERTAINTY
UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION’S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR
WASTE, 105, 105 (Alison Macfarlane & Rodney Ewing eds., 2006).
47
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, YUCCA MOUNTAIN:
THE MOST STUDIED REAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 16–17 (2006), available at
http://www.epw.senate.gov/repwhitepapers/YuccaMountainEPWReport.pdf.
Geology is a complex field that applies multiple disciplines over vast time frames,
often introducing more questions than answers. For a comprehensive summary of
the geoscience issues related to the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a nuclear
waste repository, see Long & Ewing, supra note 29. See also DEP’T OF ENERGY,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY FOR
THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NEVADA, DOE/EIS-0250 (2002).
48
See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO
L. REV. 423, 423-29 (2010). Scientists advanced three primary reasons why Yucca
Mountain would never be suitable for a permanent repository. First, they contend
that porous volcanic tuff is not ideal for nuclear waste storage, as it may release
carbon-14, a radioactive gas, from the spent fuel into the air. See generally Ning
Lu & Benjamin Ross, Simulation of Gas Phase Transport of Carbon-14 at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, USA, 14 WASTE MANAGEMENT, 409 (1994). Second, they
express concern that moisture will corrode the containers because the repository is
positioned above a water table, relatively shallow, and subject to high temperatures.
See Adams, supra note 48, at 425. Third, the Yucca Mountain site is seismically
active and prone to earthquakes. Id; see also State of Nevada Petition to Intervene,
In the Matter of U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No.
63-001-HLW,
available
at
http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/licensing/Contentions_NV.pdf.
49
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
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override the state’s veto, which President George W. Bush signed,
allowing the DOE to proceed with the license application. 50 In 2008,
the DOE submitted the first license application to the NRC to
construct the Yucca Mountain repository. 51
Despite over twenty years of effort dedicated exclusively to
this site, the Yucca Mountain Repository Program was suspended
indefinitely in 2010. 52 Under instructions from President Obama, the
Secretary of Energy filed a motion to withdraw its license application
in March 2010. 53 While Yucca Mountain notably endured local
opposition over several decades, crucially, the project was subject to
yearly congressional appropriations. 54 Facing a projected final cost
of $76 billion, 55 the DOE announced in the fiscal year of 2010 that
“all funding for development of the Yucca Mountain facility has been
eliminated, such as further land acquisition, transportation access,
and additional engineering.” 56 The administration stated that its
decision to terminate the program was for policy reasons, and did not
cite any safety or technical reasons. 57 The 2012 Blue Ribbon
50

Id. However, the battle did not end there. With no authority in the
“political decision making process,” Nevada has effectively delayed the project
through legal means. Stewart, supra note 17, at 797. The State of Nevada and
various environmental groups have legally challenged the regulatory standards
issued by the DOE, NRC, and EPA for the Yucca facility, resulting in some partial
victories. Id.
51
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
52
Lisa Mascaro, Feds File Request for Suspension of Yucca Mountain
VEGAS
SUN
(Feb.
1,
2010),
License,
LAS
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/01/feds-move-withdraw-yuccamountain-license-applicat/.
53
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MOTION TO WITHDRAW, ASLBP No. 09892-HLW-CAB04 (Mar. 3, 2010).
54
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND
SAVINGS: BUDGET OF THE U.S. FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 68 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-TRS/pdf/BUDGET-2010-TRS.pdf;
see also supra note 31 and accompanying text regarding the Nuclear Waste Fund.
55
DEPT. OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COST
OF THE CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, Fiscal Year
2007, No. RW-0591 (2008).
56
Richard M. Jones, FY 2010 Energy & Water Development
Appropriations Bill: Nuclear Waste, Number 119, FYI: The AIP Bulletin of
Oct. 6, 2009,
Science Policy News, AM. INST. OF PHYSICS.
http://www.aip.org/fyi/2009/119.html.
57
G.A.O. 11-229, supra note 44, at 11.
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Commission Report to the Secretary of Energy concluded that the
failure of Yucca Mountain was rooted in political inadequacies—
namely the NWPA’s rigid “prescriptiveness” and non-consensual site
selection process. 58
Much ink has been spilled regarding Yucca Mountain’s
suitability as a nuclear waste repository and whether the project
should be revived. 59 Nonetheless, the Yucca Mountain repository
will not be completed for years to come, 60 if ever, and the nuclear
waste on hand already exceeds Yucca Mountain’s authorized
capacity. 61 The failure of the Yucca Mountain repository program
demonstrates that the United States is at an impasse with regard to
nuclear waste disposal. Absent renewed financial support and major
revisions to the NWPA, over 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste will
continue to reside in thirty-five states and seventy-five different
reactor sites, ten of which are shut down. 62 Concerns about long-

58

BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 23 (“The State of Nevada was not asked
for, and did not provide, consent for the site to be selected for investigation. On the
contrary, the state and a majority of its citizens strongly opposed the selection of
Yucca Mountain as a repository site . . . .”).
59
See generally Applegate, supra note 46, at 105; Adams, supra note 48;
Karoun Demirjian, Yucca Mountain Debate Returns to Capitol Hill, LAS VEGAS
SUN (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/aug/02/yuccamountain-debate-returns-capitol-hill/; Brian Wingfield, Yucca Nuclear Debate
Seen Revived as Court Rebuffs NRC, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-14/yucca-nuclear-debate-seen-revivedas-court-rebuffs-nrc.html.
60
Under the NWPA, the NRC is obligated to issue a decision regarding
Yucca Mountain within three years of the DOE’s license submission. 42 U.S.C. §
10134(d) (2006). Thus, the NRC’s licensing decision was due in June 2011. In
August 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus against the NRC for violating the NWPA’s statutory mandate for its
failure to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process. In re Aiken Cty., 725
F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Although the NRC argued that the licensing proceeding
should not continue because the project lacked Congressional appropriations, the
Court held that the NRC is currently “flouting the law” and the agency is legally
obligated to resume licensing proceedings with the funds that are currently
available to it. Id. at 5–7.
61
See supra Part IIA–B.
62
Rodney Ewing & Frank von Hippel, Nuclear Waste Management in the
United States—Starting Over, 325 SCIENCE 151, 151 (2009).
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term security, health, and safety are at an all-time high, while trust
and confidence in U.S. nuclear waste policy is at an all-time low. 63
III. THE NUCLEAR LICENSING PROCESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
LICENSING DECISIONS
Despite the close of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program,
commercial nuclear power plants have continued their daily
operations. The DOE will eventually need to address the status of
the federal repository program as part of its obligations under the
NWPA. In the meantime, though, the NRC continues to regulate
commercial nuclear operations in the United States. A key task of
the NRC is to review applications and issue or renew operating
licenses to nuclear power plants. 64
The majority of today’s nuclear power plants were licensed
during the 1960s and 1970s, and thus subject to a different licensing
process. 65 Under the old licensing procedure, nuclear power plants
were granted a construction permit based on an initial design or
blueprint. 66 Safety and environmental concerns were addressed after
the permit was issued and usually were not resolved until close to the
completion of the site. 67 The public would not have access to the
details of the design until the plant was almost fully constructed. 68 In
1989, the NRC updated the licensing procedure to ensure that safety
and regulatory concerns were addressed at an earlier stage and to
open up the process for public involvement. 69 Under the new rules,
the complete process is estimated to take ten years, including siting,
approval, construction, and development. 70 No nuclear developer has

63

See generally BRC Report, supra note 3.
About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N (July 18, 2013),
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html.
65
Licensing New Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Oct.
2010),
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/Licensing_New_Nuclear_Power
_Plants_October_2010.pdf?ext=.pdf.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id; see also 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.15–.27 (2012).
70
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 626.
64
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yet completed the entire licensing process under the post-1989
rules. 71
A. Current Licensing Procedure for Commercial Nuclear Reactors
Under 10 C.F.R. § 52, the nuclear licensing process is divided
into three overarching phases. First, the developer submits an
application for an Early Site Permit (ESP), which is normally drafted
and approved within thirty months. 72 The ESP is valid for twenty
years, during which time the developer may take foundational steps
for construction of a nuclear reactor on the property. 73 The NRC has
issued four ESPs thus far, with the process ranging from thirty-six to
sixty months. 74 This could include surveys and investigation to
determine the best way “to link a massive new source of electricity to
the transmission grid” as well as making physical modifications to
the site. 75 In the second phase, the developer submits a proposed
nuclear reactor design to obtain a Standard Design Certificate (SDC)
from the NRC. 76 The NRC invites public participation to determine
whether the reactor design is safe by utilizing a notice-and-comment
process. 77 Ultimately, the NRC issues a rule that outlines the

71

Id.
Id. at 627.
73
Id.
74
Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html.
75
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 627.
76
Id. at 627–28.
77
10 C.F.R. §§ 52.51–.63 (2012). All proposed design certificate
rulemakings are published in the Federal Register to give the public an opportunity
to submit comments to the NRC. Id. At its discretion, the NRC may call
legislative hearings during this time. Id. After public comments have been
collected, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards issues a report to the
NRC, and the NRC may render a final decision on the design certification. Id. The
total process, from the submission of an application to the promulgation of a rule
that describes the safety parameters of the reactor design, spans three years at
minimum. Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628. Notice and comment procedures are
used throughout the NRC. Any member of the public may petition the NRC to
develop a rulemaking or even modify an existing one. See, e.g., The Rulemaking
Petition Process, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
72

Fall 2013

Waist-Deep in Nuclear Waste

737

requirements of the approved reactor design. 78 The SDC is valid for
ten to fifteen years, with the ability to renew for a second term.79
The NRC has certified four designs under this procedure. 80 In the
third and final phase, the developer applies for a Combined
Construction & Operating License (COL) from the NRC.81 The COL
authorizes the developer to actually construct the proposed reactor. 82
Developers must overcome extreme financial obstacles in the private
sector—to the tune of $10 billion—in order to begin construction of a
nuclear facility. 83 Therefore, the NRC reviews each COL application
for the developer’s qualifications and operational programs, and
verifies construction under inspections, tests, analyses, and
acceptance criteria before issuing a COL. 84 Although eighteen power
plants have submitted applications for twenty-eight new reactors, no
COL has been issued to date. 85 A complete COL approval is
predicted to take twenty-four to forty months for approval. 86 The
COL is valid for forty years from the date of issuance, and can be
renewed for another twenty years. 87
In addition to regulating the construction of a nuclear reactor,
the NRC also regulates the storage of SNF through its licensing
process. Storage of SNF at the same active reactor site is covered by

78

Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628.
10 C.F.R. § 52.55.
80
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 628.
81
Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
82
Id.
83
See Gundlach, supra note 7 (explaining that nuclear energy developers
face uncertainties in the form of technological designs, licensing, engineering and
fuel costs, severe construction delays, high insurance rates, and reactor lifespan and
decommissioning costs). “In addition to developing the reactor itself, a developer
must also plan for: (1) how to integrate that new reactor into the electricity
transmission grid; (2) who will staff the plant and operate the reactor; and (3) how
much it will cost to acquire fuel and manage the radioactive waste left behind . . . .”
Id. at 629–30.
84
Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N, supra note 81.
85
Id.
86
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 629.
87
10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2012).
79
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its general operating license. 88 Therefore, a facility does not have to
apply for a separate license to store SNF in its containment pools.
However, if the facility decides to rearrange the assemblies within
the pool to increase its capacity, the license must be amended to
reflect this change. 89 Likewise, dry cask storage located on an active
reactor site is covered by the plant’s general operating license. 90 The
facility must notify the NRC and obtain certification for the design of
the cask. 91 General licenses authorizing storage of SNF are valid for
forty years from the date issued, but can be renewed for another
twenty years. 92 Storage of SNF at an off-site location requires a sitespecific license obtained under a different process. 93 A site-specific
license for an independent spent fuel storage installation is valid for
twenty years with an option for renewal. 94
B. NEPA: Addressing Safety and Environmental Concerns in the
Licensing Process
Nuclear development and waste storage raise a host of safety
and environmental concerns that play a major role in the NRC’s
regulatory function. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was formed in 1970 as the agency charged with enforcing
environmental regulations under an array of federal laws. 95 For
instance, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act specifically authorizes the
EPA to establish standards that apply to both DOE-operated and
NRC-licensed facilities to protect the public from radioactive
material. 96 In addition to EPA standards, NEPA established
88

See 10 C.F.R. § 72.212 (2012).
de Saillan, supra note 8, at 475 (citing Lower Alloways Creek Twp. v.
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982)).
90
10 C.F.R. § 72.210.
91
See 10 C.F.R. § 72.212(b).
92
See Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR
REG. COMM’N, supra note 81; see also 10 C.F.R. § 72.42.
93
Spent Fuel Storage Licensing, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/licensing.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
94
Id.
95
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (Dec. 2,
1970).
96
42 U.S.C. § 10141(a) (2012).
89
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procedural requirements for all federal government agencies to
evaluate possible environmental effects of future federal agency
actions. 97 Thus, the NRC has a dual responsibility to ensure
compliance with EPA standards and to conduct environmental
evaluations pursuant to NEPA.
NEPA is implicated when a federal agency proposes a “major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 98
Under NEPA, the agency must prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or, alternatively, conduct an
environmental assessment (EA) and make a Finding of No
Significant Environmental Impact (FONSI). 99 An EIS or FONSI can
be challenged in court on procedural or substantive grounds.
However, NEPA is an “essentially procedural” statute because it
requires the agency to research and report on the full range of
environmental consequences with the intent of producing “fully
informed and well-considered” decisions, but it does not mandate
that an agency choose the most environmentally protective
decision. 100
It is well established that the granting of a nuclear reactor
license is a major federal action affecting the quality of the human
environment. 101 Specifically, the issuance of an ESP implicates
NEPA and requires the submission of an EIS to detail “the siting’s
effects on the human environment.” 102 Likewise, the issuance of a
COL implicates NEPA and requires the submission of an EIS. The
NRC estimates that the entire environmental review process—
including scoping, issuance of the draft EIS, the notice and comment
period, revisions, and issuance of the final EIS—spans two years.103
NEPA documents are subject to judicial review and often stimulate
97

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
99
Id.
100
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
101
10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (2012); see also New York v. Nuclear Reg.
Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 2009).
102
Gundlach, supra note 7, at 627.
103
See Regulations, Guidance, and Communications for New Reactors,
U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/regsguides-comm.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
98
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litigation, particularly when the stakes involve burial of nuclear
waste.
C. How Courts Enforce NEPA in Nuclear Licensing Decisions
The legal significance of NEPA and its future impact on the
NRC was first set forth in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 104 shortly after enactment of the
new statute. NEPA was enacted prior to the formation of the NRC,
so the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was the first agency to
promulgate rules to conform its licensing proceedings to NEPA.105
The suit arose when local residents challenged the licensing of the
Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant in Chesapeake Bay, Maryland, and
appealed the AEC’s new rule statements. 106 Although it was initially
uncertain whether NEPA would actually affect federal decisions, the
court held that NEPA was to be “rigorously enforced by reviewing
courts.” 107 The court rejected the AEC rule that limited the agency’s
consideration of environmental issues to those that were affirmatively
raised at a hearing. 108 Rather, the court held that an agency must
conduct an independent review, even where no party challenges a
conclusion, in order to create a “detailed statement” that evaluates all
environmental concerns. 109 Judge Wright explained,
NEPA establishes environmental protection as an
integral part of the [Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s] basic mandate. The primary
responsibility for fulfilling that mandate lies with the
Commission. Its responsibility is not simply to sit
back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary
contentions at the hearing stage. Rather, it must itself
104

449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
David Repka & Tyson Smith, A Dose of History: Nuclear Energy
Cases that Shaped Environmental Law, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 28, 28
(2010).
106
Id.
107
Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114). Skelly Wright, the D.C.
Circuit judge who wrote the opinion, was widely known as one of the more liberal
judges from the civil rights era. Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 28.
108
See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1118–19.
109
Id.
105
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take the initiative of considering environmental values
at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the
process . . . . 110
While Calvert Cliffs issued a clear mandate for federal
agencies to initiate comprehensive environmental reviews under
NEPA, agencies differed in their procedural approaches to carrying
out this mandate. All agencies were required to assess the impacts
and risks of major federal actions under NEPA, but precisely how
they conducted these assessments and arrived at their conclusions
was open to court scrutiny. 111 This was largely true until 1978, when
the Supreme Court delivered the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision, and severely
limited the ability of the courts to proscribe agency procedure. 112
Although Vermont Yankee had a broad application on
administrative law as a whole, the case coincidentally arose from a
nuclear licensing dispute. 113 Because the AEC faced several
challenges of the licensing of individual power plants, it opted to
issue one rule to “generically address[]” the recurring environmental
issues associated with the uranium fuel cycle. 114 The AEC
promulgated the so-called “fuel cycle rule” using an informal noticeand-comment procedure that complied with the basic requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 115 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit struck down the fuel cycle rule because of “perceived
inadequacies” of the AEC’s rulemaking procedure. 116 The Supreme
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in a powerful “rebuke to
110

Id. at 1119.
See Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.
112
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
113
Id. at 527. The dispute concerned the NRC’s decision to grant a
construction license to a Vermont power plant. Id. The NRDC and local residents
challenged the procedural rights afforded to individuals in the AEC’s licensing
process. Id. at 527–28.
114
Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.
115
Id.
116
Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found that
the AEC’s decision not to allow discovery or cross-examination of agency
personnel rendered the procedure inadequate because it deprived the challengers of
a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings as a matter of due
process. Id.
111

742

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

what it considered judicial activism of the day,” 117 holding that courts
must exercise deference to agency procedures. So long as the AEC
rulemaking procedure did not violate the “statutory minima” (the
requirements of the APA and NEPA), there was no other basis for the
court to invalidate the AEC’s procedure. 118 Absent constitutional
restraints or extremely rare circumstances, administrative agencies
“should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties.” 119 Thus, Vermont Yankee severely curtailed
judicial review of agency rulemaking procedures and engendered a
certain deference to the unique duties and expertise of administrative
agencies.
The practical effect of Vermont Yankee, then, makes it almost
impossible for reviewing courts to impose additional procedural
requirements upon the NRC. However, the NRC may grant, and has
granted, additional procedural rights at its own discretion. The
scoping and comment process under NEPA does not normally call
for an administrative hearing. 120 The NRC takes an exceptional step
beyond the requirements of NEPA by offering a full hearing
opportunity. 121 Following the NEPA review, the NRC provides an
opportunity for all “interested persons” to participate in hearings to
consider any environmental issues related to a proposed project.122
The high degree of public participation in the licensing process,
combined with the technical sophistication of the NRC as a whole,
usually results in very detailed and comprehensive environmental
impact statements. 123

117

Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.
Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548.
119
Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
120
Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.
121
Id.
122
Id. “Importantly, the standard of review for NRC hearings on
environmental issues is not skewed in favor of the agency . . . . [F]or an applicant
to prevail on a factual issue in the NRC hearing process, its position must be
supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
123
Id. “The NRC has an enviable record in defending its NEPA
documents on judicial review.” Id.
118
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D. Highly Deferential Review of Agency Scientific Determinations
The Supreme Court reinforced its deferential position toward
agency expertise in Baltimore Gas & Electric v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 124 In this case, the Court considered whether
an NRC generic rule, the “permanent storage rule,” complied with
NEPA. 125 Generic rules, like the “fuel cycle rule” in Vermont
Yankee, are settled regulations that an agency relies upon as a base
assumption in future agency decisions. 126 The NRC developed the
permanent storage rule to allow future licensing boards to assume,
for the purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain
nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact
(called the “zero release assumption”). 127 The NRC came to this
conclusion based on “tentative but favorable” evidence that an
appropriate repository site would be found to support the zero-release
assumption. 128 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the rule,
finding that it violated NEPA because it prevented future licensing
boards from considering uncertainties regarding emissions of HLW
in long-term storage. 129 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
124

462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Id. at 87.
126
Id. at 95.
127
Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 29.
128
Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 94. The Court summarized the NRC’s
conclusion:
125

[The NRC] acknowledged that this assumption was uncertain
because of the remote possibility that water might enter the
repository, dissolve the radioactive materials, and transport them
into the biosphere. Nevertheless, the Commission predicted that
a bedded-salt repository would maintain its integrity, and found
the evidence ‘tentative but favorable’ that an appropriate site
would be found.
Id. The Court acknowledged that the NRC carefully considered and disclosed all
relevant uncertainties as required by NEPA and properly concluded that these
uncertainties were “not sufficient to affect the outcome of any individual licensing
decision.” Id. at 97–98.
129
Id. at 96. The heart of the dispute was the values within Table S-3, a
numerical table adopted in the NRC regulations that estimated the emissions
generated by one year of fuel cycle activities from the average commercial reactor.
Id. at 91.
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upholding the NRC’s permanent storage rule as the result of a proper
evaluation under NEPA and the APA. 130
From the outset, the Court maintained that generic rules are
necessary and “clearly appropriate” under NEPA because they
further administrative efficiency, consistency of decision, and
prevent “needless repetition of litigation.” 131 The importance of
Baltimore Gas & Electric, however, is the degree of deference that
the Court extends to agency decisions. Justice O’Connor reminded
reviewing courts:
The [NRC] is making predictions, within its area of
special expertise, at the frontiers of science. . . . It is
not our task to determine what decision we, as
Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is
to determine whether the Commission has considered
the relevant factors and articulated a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” 132
The Court stressed that judicial inquiry into scientific or technical
determinations requires the highest level of deference. 133 The NRC’s
permanent storage rule could only be rejected upon a finding that the
NRC “acted arbitrarily or capriciously” in forming its decision, a
violation of section 10(e) of the APA. 134 Thus, Baltimore Gas &
Electric limited judicial inquiry of agency decisions to whether the
agency complied with the procedural requirements of the controlling
statutes, NEPA and the APA. 135 The extreme judicial deference to
expert agencies advanced in Baltimore Gas & Electric is a basic
foundation of administrative law. 136
130

Id. at 108.
Id. at 101.
132
Id. at 103–05.
133
Id. at 103.
134
Id. at 87.
135
Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 30.
136
Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 87; see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding courts must defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of statutory authority where the intent of
Congress is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable or permissible); N.J.
Envtl. Fed’n v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 645 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
131
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IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS VACATES THE NRC
WASTE CONFIDENCE DECISION
Although the Supreme Court yielded to the expertise of the
NRC in Baltimore Gas & Electric, states and private interest groups
continue to call on the courts to review certain NRC decisions.137
One NRC rule in particular, called the Waste Confidence Decision
(WCD), has been the center of litigation and scientific controversy
for nearly three decades. 138 The WCD is a generic rule published in
1984 and amended several times, recently culminating in a lawsuit in
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the WCD stood in violation of NEPA. 139 In August of 2012,
shortly after this judgment, the NRC issued an indefinite freeze on all
licensing proceedings. 140
A. The Development of the Waste Confidence Decision
The NRC originally issued the WCD in response to the
judgment in Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 141 In this
case, the D.C. Circuit remanded two licensing actions that allowed
NRC did not abuse its discretion by rejecting challenge of ultrasonic testing
monitoring frequency at nuclear plant); Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. Salazar, 606
F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service did not
arbitrarily designate critical habitat for Mexican spotted owl under Endangered
Species Act); BCCA Appeal Group v. U.S. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding EPA’s approval of state plan for zone attainment was not arbitrary or
capricious); Bark v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Or.
2009) (holding Bureau’s environmental assessment of logging project satisfied
requirements of NEPA and was not arbitrary or capricious); Nat’l Home Equity
Mortg. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003)
(holding OTS permissibly construed statute as allowing it to identify which
regulations apply to state creditors).
137
See Repka & Smith, supra note 105, at 32.
138
CTR. FOR NUCLEAR WASTE REG. ANALYSES, SUMMARY REPORT: THE
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE OF WASTE CONFIDENCE, 1–5 (1988), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0333/ML033371006.pdf.
139
New York v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
140
NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, MEMORANDUM & ORDER TO SUSPEND FINAL
DECISIONS IN ALL PENDING REACTOR LICENSING PROCEEDINGS PENDING
COMPLETION OF REMANDED WASTE CONFIDENCE PROCEEDINGS, CLI-12-16 (2012)
[hereinafter NRC ORDER].
141
602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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the expansion of SNF pools, demanding that the NRC answer
particular questions that should have been addressed in the
administrative record under NEPA. 142 The court asked the NRC to
consider whether there was “reasonable assurance” that (1) an offsite storage solution will be available by the expiration of the plant’s
operating licenses and (2) if not, the fuel could be stored safely at the
sites beyond those dates. 143 The court also acknowledged that the
NRC could properly address these waste disposal issues in a generic
rule because they were “essentially common to all nuclear
facilities.” 144
In response, the NRC published the original WCD in 1984. 145
The original WCD included five “Waste Confidence Findings,”
briefly summarized as follows: the NRC found “reasonable
assurance” that (1) safe disposal of HLW and SNF in a mined
geologic repository is technically feasible; (2) one or more geologic
repositories will be available by 2007 to 2009; (3) waste will be
managed safely until a repository is available; (4) if necessary, SNF
can be stored safely at nuclear plants at least thirty years beyond the
licensed life of each plant; and (5) safe, independent storage will be
made available when needed. 146 In 1990, the NRC amended Finding
2 to predict the creation of a permanent geologic repository by
2025. 147 The NRC relied on the WCD as a generic rule to comply
with NEPA in subsequent license issuances and renewals.
Over the years, the NRC has periodically reviewed the WCD
to address the changing status of the DOE geologic repository
program. In 2008, the NRC proposed substantial revisions to the
WCD. After receiving public comments, the NRC reaffirmed three
of its findings and amended two of its findings in 2010. 148 The NRC
amended Finding 2 to state that a permanent repository will become

142

Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
144
Id. at 417.
145
Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (Aug. 31, 1984).
146
Id. at 34,659–60.
147
Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,474, 38,505
(Sept. 18, 1990).
148
Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23,
2010) [hereinafter WCD Update].
143
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available “when necessary” rather than by a specific year. 149 The
NRC arrived at this conclusion after considering the “the political
and technical obstacles” in creating a permanent repository, and
determined that one will be available “when the safety of temporary
on-site storage can no longer be assured.” 150
The NRC also amended Finding 4, known as the “Temporary
Storage Rule” (TSR). 151 The original TSR stated that SNF could be
stored safely on-site for thirty years beyond the licensed life of the
nuclear power plant, including the license renewal period. 152 The
updated version of Finding 4 now states that SNF can be safely
stored on-site for sixty years beyond the licensed life of the plant,
including the license renewal period. 153 In developing this finding,
the NRC assessed the environmental risks of temporary storage,
specifically the risk of leakage from containment pools and the risk
of fire caused by SNF exposure to air. 154 With regard to potential
leaks, the NRC studied previous leaks at facilities and found that the
near-term health effects were negligible. 155 The NRC predicted a
further reduction in leaks as a result of recent regulations, and
concluded that leaks do not pose a threat of a significant
environmental impact. 156 Similarly, the NRC determined that the
likelihood of pool fires was low enough to present no threat of a
significant environmental impact. 157
B. New York v. NRC Renders Waste Confidence Decision Invalid
On June 8, 2012, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision for lacking a sufficient
environmental evaluation under NEPA in New York v. Nuclear
149
150

Id.
New York v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 475 (D.C. Cir.

2012).
151

WCD Update, supra note 148, at 81,038.
Id.
153
Id. at 81,037. The sixty-year period applies to various types of
temporary storage—“a combination of storage in its spent fuel storage basin and
either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.” Id.
154
New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 475.
155
Id. at 481.
156
WCD Update, supra note 148, at 81,069–71.
157
New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 475.
152
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Regulatory Commission. 158 The states of New York, New Jersey,
Vermont, and Connecticut, along with an Indian community and
multiple environmental groups, petitioned for judicial review of the
2010 amendments to the WCD relating to permanent disposal and
temporary storage of nuclear waste. 159 The judgment was founded
on two main holdings. First, the court held that the WCD constitutes
a “major federal action” under NEPA, requiring either an EIS or a
FONSI. 160 Second, the court held that the NRC’s evaluation of risks
was a “deficient” environmental assessment under NEPA. 161
The court first assessed whether the WCD itself constituted a
“major federal action” implicating NEPA. The NRC contended that
the WCD was simply a response to the court’s mandate in Minnesota
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to provide general public
assurance that permanent disposal of nuclear waste will be
accomplished safely in the future. 162 The NRC maintained that the
WCD is not a major federal action because the WCD itself “does not
authorize the licensing of any nuclear reactor or storage facility,” but
rather, the agency conducts a site-specific EIS for each individual
licensing action. 163 In rejecting this argument, the court explained
that it failed to align with controlling precedent. 164 Under Calvert
Cliffs, NEPA requires environmental evaluation by an agency “at
every important stage in the decision-making process.” 165 While the
licensure of a nuclear power plant clearly falls within this category,
“major federal actions” also include actions with “indirect effects,
which . . . are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still
reasonably foreseeable.” 166 The court reasoned that the WCD, a
generic rulemaking with preclusive effect in all future licensing
decisions, is a “pre-determined ‘stage’” of each and every licensing
decision. 167 Even though site-specific factors can be contested with
158

Id. at 483.
Id. at 473.
160
Id. at 476.
161
Id. at 473.
162
Id. at 476.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
167
New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 476.
159

Fall 2013

Waist-Deep in Nuclear Waste

749

each license, the overall conclusions of the WCD apply as fact in
every licensing decision. The court expounded, “It is not only
reasonably foreseeable but eminently clear that the WCD will be
used to enable licensing decisions based on its findings.”168
Therefore, based on the far-reaching and significant effects of the
WCD, the court concluded that the WCD constituted a “major federal
action” that activated the procedural requirements of NEPA. 169
None of the parties contested that the WCD lacked an EIS as
outlined under NEPA. An agency has discretion whether to prepare
an EIS or an EA. The court explained that an EIS is not required
under NEPA so long as “the agency conducts an EA and issues a
FONSI sufficiently explaining why the proposed action will not have
a significant environmental impact.” 170 An agency’s decision not to
prepare an EIS is viewed with considerable deference, and may only
be overturned if it is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion
. . . .” 171 The NRC argued that the WCD, viewed in light of NEPA
obligations, constituted an EA that ultimately had a finding of no
significant environmental impact. 172
The court assessed this
argument with respect to both of the challenged Findings—Finding 2
and Finding 4.
Finding 2 in the WCD Update states that a permanent
repository for SNF will be made available “when necessary.” 173 The
petitioners argued that the WCD Update was inadequate for three
reasons: first, the NRC did not give proper weight to the social and
political barriers that have historically hindered the creation of a
repository; second, the NRC failed “to define the term ‘necessary’ in
any meaningful way”; and third, the NRC did not examine “the
effects of a failure to establish a repository in time.” 174 The NRC
responded that it “candidly acknowledged” the social and political
challenges, but the agency itself cannot overcome those
challenges. 175 Further, the NRC argued that NEPA does not require
168

Id. at 477.
Id. at 476.
170
Id. at 477.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 476.
173
Id. at 478.
174
Id. at 477.
175
Id. at 478.
169
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date-specific predictions, and the agency has used the “when
necessary” formulation as far back as 1977. 176
Ultimately, the court held that the NRC’s WCD Update did
not produce a sufficient FONSI because it did not assess the
environmental effects of failing to establish a repository. 177 Under
NEPA, an agency must examine “both the probabilities of potentially
harmful events and the consequences if those events come to
pass.” 178 The NRC dismissed the possibility of a failure to secure a
geologic repository because it did not discuss the risks or the
consequences of such a scenario. The court determined that all
aspects of the WCD “presumes the existence of a geologic
repository.” 179 An agency may issue a FONSI, however, if the
probability of occurrence is “so low as to be ‘remote and
speculative.’” 180 The court reasoned that the NRC rulemaking did
not meet this standard, because “reasonable assurance” that
permanent storage will become available someday is a “far cry” from
finding that the likelihood of failure to secure permanent storage is
“remote and speculative.” 181 Relying on the political history of the
federal repository program, the failure to secure permanent storage
was no “remote or speculative” idea to the court:
Due to the government’s failure to establish a final
resting place for spent fuel, SNF is currently stored on
site at nuclear plants.
This type of storage,
optimistically labeled “temporary storage,” has been
used for decades longer than originally anticipated. . .
. The lack of progress on a permanent repository has
caused considerable uncertainty regarding the
environmental effects of temporary SNF storage and
176

Id.
Id.
178
Id. (emphasis added).
179
Id. at 479.
180
Id. at 478. Computation of environmental risks under NEPA is not
uniformly defined, and can result in different and arguable conclusions. The court
offered a vague formula for computing risk under NEPA: “The concept of overall
risk incorporates the significance of possible adverse consequences discounted by
the improbability of their occurrence.” Id. at 479 (quoting City of N.Y. v. Dep't of
Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 738 (2d Cir.1983)).
181
Id. at 479.
177
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the reasonableness of continuing to license and
relicense nuclear reactors . . . .
....
. . . The Commission apparently has no long-term plan
other than hoping for a geologic repository. If the
government continues to fail in its quest to establish
one, then SNF will seemingly be stored on site at
nuclear plants on a permanent basis. The Commission
can and must assess the potential environmental
effects of such a failure. 182
Concluding that the NRC ignored the risks and consequences
of a failure to secure permanent storage, the Court held that the NRC
did not conduct a sufficient EA under NEPA with respect to the
WCD Update. 183
Finding 4, or the TSR, stated that SNF can be stored safely
on-site for sixty years beyond the licensed life of the plant, instead of
thirty years. The NRC maintained that this increase in time produced
no significant environmental impact, 184 and petitioners objected on
two grounds. First, petitioners argued that a generic rulemaking was
not appropriate here because the risks of temporary storage largely
depend on site-specific factors, thus calling for individual
assessments. 185 Second, petitioners argued that even if a generic rule
were satisfactory, this generic rule was insufficient because the
agency did not thoroughly evaluate the risks of future SNF pool leaks
and fires. 186 The NRC countered that it had examined previous SNF
pool leaks and the damage from past leaks “have been shown to be
quite minimal.”187 The NRC also argued that it has engaged in
“exhaustive consideration” of the risk of pool fires and found such an
event to be “extremely unlikely,” or “so low that the consequences

182

Id. at 474, 479.
Id. at 483.
184
Id. at 476.
185
Id. at 479. These site-specific factors include “pool configuration, leak
detection systems, the nature of SNF stored in the pool, and the location of the pool
within the plant.” Id.
186
Id. at 479–80.
187
Id. at 480.
183
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could not possibly overcome the low probability.” 188 A site-by-site
approach was not necessary, the NRC claimed, because the generic
rule was predicated on studies that addressed plant-to-plant
variations. According to the NRC, even the “most dangerous
combinations of site-specific factors” resulted in an extremely low
risk of fire. 189
Considering these arguments, the court endorsed the use of a
generic rulemaking for the temporary storage issue.
A
comprehensive rule addressing “on-site risks that are essentially
common to all plants” is appropriate and well established under
NEPA. 190 Although the court upheld the concept of a generic
rulemaking to address temporary storage, it rejected the actual rule
and its underlying environmental assessment. 191 Acknowledging that
Baltimore Gas called for the highest level of deference toward
agency decisions, the court stated that the NRC “failed to conduct a
thorough enough analysis here to merit our deference.” 192 The court
deemed the NRC’s evaluation of pool leaks to be seriously flawed
because the agency examined the harm caused by past leaks only,
which reveals little about the potential of future leaks. 193 The court
explained that “a proper analysis of the risks would necessarily look
forward” in order to study the impact of thirty additional years of
SNF storage. 194 The court also pointed out that the NRC failed to
assess any environmental impacts other than near-term health
effects. 195 Therefore, the court found that the NRC’s environmental
analysis of pool leaks was insufficient. 196
With respect to SNF pool fires, the court faulted the NRC for
failing to discuss the consequences of a potential fire. 197 The court
recognized that the agency conducted a thorough evaluation of the
risks of fire and accepted its conclusion that the risks were extremely
188

Id.
Id.
190
Id. Also, interested parties have an opportunity to raise site-specific
differences at the time of an individual plant’s licensing. Id.
191
Id. at 480–81.
192
Id. at 481.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 482.
189
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low. 198 However, NEPA still requires the agency to examine both
the risks and the consequences of a fire if it were to occur. 199 The
court determined that the NRC “did not undertake to examine the
consequences of pool fires at all,” so the NRC did not produce a
sufficient EA under NEPA. 200
In sum, the court vacated the WCD Update because it lacked
a thorough environmental analysis as required by NEPA. Yet the
crucial aspect of this case is not so much the procedural requirements
of NEPA, but rather what it says about permanent storage of nuclear
waste. The language throughout the opinion exhibits a strong
skepticism toward the entire federal repository program, 201 perhaps
reflecting the public perception as well. It would appear, if only at a
superficial level, that the NRC is simply extending the amount of
time that SNF can be stored on-site to cope with the unmet deadlines
of a failing repository program. The effect of the WCD Updates
cannot be understated—it establishes a total reliance on temporary
storage, possibly for the remainder of our lives, under the assumption
that permanent storage will be attained “when necessary.” Even
affording such deference to the NRC, the WCD Updates would seem
at least suspect or doubtful. An attentive American public, including
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, needs a more comprehensive and
convincing assessment of the current nuclear waste disposal program.
C. NRC Responds to New York v. NRC by Implementing Licensing
Freeze
While New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was
“another in the growing line of cases” 202 relating to the government’s
failure to establish a permanent nuclear waste repository, it diverged
198

Id.
Id.
200
Id.
201
The Court expressed doubt for the program based on the futility of past
combined efforts, rather than the fault of any particular agency. “Yet despite years
of blue ribbon commissions, congressional hearings, agency reports, and site
investigations, the United States has not yet developed a permanent solution.” Id.
at 474. “[W]e share petitioners’ considerable skepticism as to whether a permanent
facility can be built given the societal and political barriers to selecting a site . . . .”
Id. at 478.
202
Id. at 473.
199
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from the previous succession of cases in its remarkable result. In
August 2012, the NRC issued a Memorandum and Order in which it
announced that the agency will not issue final licenses “until the
court’s remand is appropriately addressed.” 203 The NRC explained
that the indefinite freeze extended to final license approval only, and
all licensing reviews and other proceedings will carry on as usual.204
Acknowledging the adverse ruling in New York v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the agency stated that it has not determined
a course of action. 205 It is currently “considering all available options
for resolving the waste confidence issue, which could include generic
or site-specific NRC actions, or some combination of both.” 206 The
NRC is accepting public comments for any generic determination it
makes on remand, whether it be a new rulemaking, policy statement,
EA, or EIS. 207
It is clear that the NRC must revise its environmental analysis
to provide a sounder and more convincing rulemaking regarding the
waste confidence issue. Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated the agency’s rule, it acknowledged that the NRC is in a
difficult position.208 New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
exposed the dilemma that the NRC and the entire nuclear sector is
203

NRC ORDER, supra note 140, at 4.
Id. Does this even change anything? Some nuclear energy specialists
assert that the licensing freeze will have a “minimal impact” on the industry. See
James Conca, Nuclear Waste Confidence—NRC Ruling No Big Deal, FORBES
(Aug.
12,
2012,
12:49
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/08/11/nuclear-waste-confidencenrc-ruling-no-big-deal. The nuclear sector has always been governed by a slow
moving regulatory system, and they believe that the NRC will resolve the problem
and lift the freeze “before any of the critical licensing deadlines pass.” Id. The
majority of nuclear reactors were relicensed in the last ten years and are relatively
protected against the effects of this measure. Id. Former NRC Commissioner Peter
Bradford stated that “the reactors awaiting construction licenses weren’t going to
be built anytime soon even without the court decision or today’s NRC action.”
U.S. Freezes All Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Decisions, ENVIRONMENT NEWS
SERVICE (Aug. 7, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://ens-newswire.com/2012/08/07/u-sfreezes-all-nuclear-power-plant-licensing-decisions/.
205
NRC ORDER, supra note 140, at 4.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 483 (“We recognize that the Commission is in a difficult position
given the political problems concerning the storage of spent nuclear fuel.”).
204
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facing. For over twenty years, the NRC has derived its authority to
license nuclear operations from the theory that the generated waste
will someday be put to rest in a geologic repository. The future of
nuclear energy demands the creation of a permanent repository. Yet
there is a disconnect between the NRC, whose regulatory authority
extends to commercial reactors and plants, and the DOE, the agency
authorized to construct a federal repository for this commercial
waste.
The NRC maintains that a geologic repository will be
achieved through “open and transparent” decision-making in the
future. 209 It points to the NWPA, and the federal government’s
continual mandate to construct a repository and uphold its obligations
to the nuclear energy sector. 210 The question is whether the NRC is
beholden to the long-term federal plan under the NWPA. As the
agency at the forefront of nuclear licensing battles, the NRC is under
the most direct pressure to come to terms with the state of the federal
repository program. Must the NRC continue to follow the protocol
of the NWPA, or could the agency take a distinctive approach to safe
nuclear waste disposal? The answer depends partly on the agency’s
authority, but is largely a matter of strategy for the NRC.
V. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR THE NRC TO COMPLY WITH NEPA
The NRC may choose to uphold the precept in the WCD that
a geologic repository will be achieved, and the nation’s SNF
inventory will safely remain at the reactor sites until then. The NRC
could continue down this path and still satisfy the procedural
requirements of NEPA so long as all of the risks and consequences
are accounted for in its environmental impact statement. 211 However,
this strategy does not serve the best interests of the nuclear energy
sector, and it does nothing for waste confidence. Instead, the NRC
must adopt the perspective that a new strategy is needed. The NRC
can acknowledge where the political system has failed and
recommend the safest options in light of these political inadequacies.
The DOE now calls for a complete overhaul of the federal waste
209

New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 477.
Id.
211
Id. at 482.
210
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management program, naming consolidated storage systems as an
interim solution for SNF. 212 Indeed, the NRC should incorporate a
consolidated storage plan into the next WCD.
A. Acknowledge the Failure of Yucca Mountain & the Need for a
New Strategy
At the request of the President, the Secretary of Energy
formed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future
(BRC) to conduct a massive review of previous policies and
recommend a new strategy for “managing the back end of the nuclear
fuel cycle.” 213 This broad language in the preamble (as opposed to a
narrow focus on a federal repository) reflects a more progressive
approach to the SNF problem than that of past years. First, the BRC
confirmed that the U.S. nuclear waste management program is at an
impasse. 214 It faulted federal policy tracing back to the 1987
amendments to the NWPA, which “tied the entire U.S. high-level
waste management program to the fate of the Yucca Mountain site . .
. only to come to a point where continuing to rely on the same
approach seems destined to bring further controversy, litigation, and
protracted delay.” 215 The BRC issued an eight-point plan to revive
212

BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 32–45.
See id. at iii. Between March 2010 and January 2012, the BRC and its
subcommittees convened over two dozen times to hear expert and stakeholder
testimony, to visit nuclear waste management facilities, and to hold public
meetings to gather feedback on its draft reports. Id.
214
Id. at vi.
215
Id. The BRC was not chartered to address and did not issue a
conclusion on the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a repository site. The report
stated:
213

The Obama Administration’s decision to halt work on a
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada is but the latest
indicator of a policy that has been troubled for decades and has
now all but completely broken down . . . .
. . . [W]e focused on developing a sound strategy for future
storage and disposal facilities and operations that we believe can
and should be implemented regardless of what happens with
Yucca Mountain.
Id. at vi–viii.
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the nuclear waste management program, mostly comprised of
legislative solutions. 216 Among these proposals was an amendment
to the NWPA to establish a consent-based siting process modeled
after successfully implemented programs in Finland and Sweden. 217
The BRC also proposed establishing a new, government-chartered
corporation, independent from the DOE, that would solely focus on
carrying out the waste management program. 218 The BRC proposed
changes to the federal budget rules to enable reliable access to the
Nuclear Waste Fund by separating it from the annual appropriations
process. 219
In total, the BRC Report portends drastic changes in U.S.
nuclear energy policy. Many of these recommendations could only
materialize within the legislative branch, and the NRC would have no
control over the implementation of these measures. 220 Of course,
NEPA does not require the NRC to make political predictions. Yet if
216

Id. at viii.
See id. at 48–55.
218
See id. at 60–69. Other nuclear policy experts have urged that “the
DOE should be relieved of the responsibility” of commercial nuclear waste
management, and instead focus solely on the waste generated by nuclear weapons
and naval reactor programs. See Ewing & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 152.
Rather than shifting management to a new federal government entity, they argue
for state governments to pursue consolidated storage options within their regions.
Id.
219
See BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 70–79. The other points in the plan
included:
217

4. Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal
facilities.
5. Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage
facilities.
6. Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage
and disposal facilities when such facilities become available.
7. Support for continued U.S. innovation in nuclear energy
technology and for workforce development.
8. Active U.S. leadership in international efforts to address
safety, waste-management, non-proliferation and security
concerns.
Id. at vii (footnote omitted).
220
Id.
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an agency’s rulemaking depends on the occurrence of a future
political action, the agency must have some rational basis to rely on
that political outcome. This explains why the NRC’s decisions have
historically aligned with the NWPA’s program and timeline.
However, NEPA is concerned with the realistic environmental
outcomes of a major federal action. As New York v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission clearly demonstrated, NEPA requires the
agency to disclose the probabilities of potentially harmful events and
the consequences “if those events come to pass.” 221 For the purposes
of NEPA, the NRC cannot presume the creation of a federal
repository under the NWPA. 222 Due to the prolonged delay in the
federal repository program, the NRC should formulate and assess a
consolidated storage plan as an interim waste confidence solution to
satisfy NEPA’s procedural directives.
B. Consolidated Storage: An Interim Solution
Although the BRC Report highlighted many political defects
in the nuclear waste management program, the WCD addresses
temporary on-site storage and geologic repository disposal. By
concentrating exclusively on these two stages, the U.S. nuclear waste
management program is conspicuously lacking what a recent
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study described as “a
major component of nuclear fuel cycle policy.” 223 This key
component is long-term interim storage, or “consolidated storage.”
221

New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 478 (D.C.

Cir. 2012).
222

Of course, official legislative approval in the form of an Act adds
credence to the agency’s prediction. Likewise, federal appropriations to carry out
the plan lend further support. But the procedural directives of NEPA remain the
same.
223
PHIL SHARP ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE
NUCLEAR
FUEL
CYCLE
5
(2011),
available
at
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/The_Nuclear_Fuel_Cycle-all.pdf.
Waste
management programs in other countries, such as France and Sweden, have built
consolidated storage facilities to keep SNF for forty to sixty years to reduce
radioactivity and heat before disposal. Id. The United States lacks consolidated
storage as a formal phase, and “[t]he failure to include long term storage as part of
the spent fuel management has had major impacts on the design of the proposed
Yucca Mountain Repository (YMR).” Id.
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Instead of densely packing SNF into on-site containment pools that
were never designed to be long-term storage facilities, 224 nuclear
policy experts are recommending that the U.S. transition toward
centralized SNF storage facilities. 225 Consolidated storage would not
replace the need for a geologic repository. Managed storage is
believed to be safe for a century, but eventually the SNF storage
casks degrade due to radioactivity, heat load, and external
conditions. 226 Consolidated storage would serve as an integral part of
a long-term nuclear fuel cycle plan that includes a permanent
repository as a final destination. 227 Ultimately, long-term storage
“provides time” to achieve proper development of one or more
repositories while offering certain safety advantages. 228
“Stranded” SNF, residing at reactor sites that have been shut
down, provide the strongest case for consolidated storage. 229 The
MIT study recommended that SNF “should be removed as soon as
possible from decommissioned reactor sites to centralized storage
facilities or operating reactor facilities.” 230 Although the quantity of
stranded SNF is small (roughly equal to one year’s worth of U.S.
production), the costs to store at decommissioned sites are
disproportionately high. 231 This relatively small quantity of SNF
must be monitored at the old reactor site, costing between 4.5 and 8
million dollars per year. 232 The BRC Report found that the “savings
achievable by consolidating stranded spent fuel at a centralized
224

“[I]t is clear that today’s institutional arrangements and storage
technologies were not designed for the lengthy storage timescales that now appear
inevitable for at least some of the nation’s spent fuel inventory.” BRC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 34.
225
Echoing the findings of the 2010 MIT interdisciplinary study, the BRC
Report also recommended a transition to consolidated storage as one of the points
in its eight-point plan. Id. at vii.
226
SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 6.
227
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
228
SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 5.
229
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at xii.
230
SHARP ET AL., supra note 223, at 5.
231
Id. At active reactor sites, SNF storage is a relatively low burden
because they already have the necessary security and “only an incremental effort is
required” to cover the independent storage installation under their operating
licenses. BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
232
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 35.
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facility would be enough to pay for that facility.” 233 Apart from cost,
there are some long-term safety issues associated with storage at
decommissioned sites. Most decommissioned sites now lack the
ability to extract the storage casks for inspection, and over time,
degradation of the casks may impair their transportation to other
locations. 234 Consolidated storage facilities could be developed to
actively manage and inspect the casks. 235 Similarly, future safety and
security regulations can be implemented more cost-effectively at a
centralized facility. 236
Consolidated storage does more than simply alleviate the
burden on decommissioned sites; it offers much-needed flexibility for
the entire waste management program. 237 Even though the current
storage arrangements have not been deemed unsafe, reactor sites
would at least have the option of lowering their SNF inventory and
reducing the heat loads of their reactor pools. 238 In light of the events
at Fukushima, 239 it is clear that unforeseen situations can arise and
demand immediate responses. The BRC report conceded that the
United States “lacks any capability to receive spent fuel in
emergency situations.” 240 In an accident scenario, SNF could be
233

Id.
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 32.
238
Id. at 38.
239
In March 2011, an earthquake and fifteen-meter tsunami caused the
Fukushima I nuclear power plant to experience a “melt-down”; literally, the nuclear
reactors severely overheated and melted. WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Fukushima
Accident 2011, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2013). The disaster was primarily caused by the flooding of the emergency
generators, which cut off the power supply and inhibited the cooling and water
circulation processes of the plant. Id. High radioactive releases into the air in the
first few days prompted the evacuation of 100,000 people from the area. Id.
Several employees of the plant were treated for physical injuries, but fortunately,
no known deaths or cases of radiation sickness resulted from the Fukushima
accident. Id.
240
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 38. Existing contracts with nuclear
utilities companies have created a “queue” for SNF to be accepted by the federal
government. Id. at 42. The DOE is seeking to revise the queue’s current order.
See id. at 38. Theoretically, this queue could be quickly rearranged in an
emergency situation, but this would only be relevant if there were a facility or
repository to accept SNF. Id.
234
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discharged and moved off-site at a moment’s notice to a consolidated
storage facility with wet storage space. 241 Consolidated storage also
offers more secure placement of nuclear waste than under the present
system. Unlike nuclear reactors, which are located near large sources
of water, consolidated storage sites would be located in areas of the
country with less severe weather patterns. 242 Consolidated storage
sites would be placed in isolated areas of the U.S. where the risk of
“broad-based population exposures in the event of a disaster are
lower, and where local conditions are conducive to effectively
monitoring and managing security risks.” 243
From a practical standpoint, the nuclear regulatory structure is
able to accommodate a consolidated storage plan. Currently, nuclear
power plants are classified into four NRC-created regions: West,
Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast. 244 This could also serve as the
regional division for future interim storage sites. Nuclear wasteproducing states should have the incentive to pursue, or at least
cooperate with, the installment of consolidated storage sites to accept
SNF within their regions. 245 Also, the federal government will begin
meeting its legal obligations under the NWPA by moving SNF into
consolidated storage. 246 The removal of SNF from reactor sites is a
huge step that would relieve taxpayers of further damage awards
resulting from the DOE’s failure to perform under its existing
contracts. 247
In terms of NEPA compliance, the NRC can address the
major faults of its vacated WCD by embracing a consolidated storage
plan. First, a long-term consolidated storage system lessens the
gravity of a failure to secure permanent storage under Finding 2. If
the NRC formulates a consolidated storage system designed to safely
store SNF for at least a century, the necessity of a permanent
repository will be lessened and/or extended. Second, the agency’s
risk-analysis of temporary storage would be bolstered by
incorporating a comprehensive consolidated storage plan under
241

Id.
Id.
243
Id.
244
Ewing & von Hippel, supra note 62, at 152.
245
See id.
246
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
247
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 37.
242
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Finding 4. Centralized storage facilities have the ability to accept
degrading casks of SNF that pose the highest danger based on factors
that the NRC determines, such as the age of the SNF, location at a
decommissioned site, and other risk indicators. 248 A generic
rulemaking that includes a sixty-year timeline for temporary storage
would be more reasonable if consolidated long-term storage facilities
existed.
The main legal obstacle that prevents immediate development
of consolidated storage facilities is the 1987 Amendment to the
NWPA, which authorizes the development of one geologic repository
and precludes the development of monitored retrievable storage
(MRS) sites. 249 However, the federal government may still site,
design, and even obtain construction authorization for MRS (i.e.,
consolidated storage) facilities.250 For a consolidated storage facility
to fully materialize, though, Congress would have to amend the
NWPA to allow construction of a storage facility independent of the
status of a repository. 251 Because the SNF on hand already exceeds
the 70,000 metric tons of storage capacity authorized by the NWPA,
and for other reasons, the NWPA is unarguably outdated. An
amendment to the NWPA is foreseeable if the nuclear waste issue
makes its way onto the political agenda.
What does this mean for the NRC? If the agency wishes to
pursue consolidated storage as part of its waste confidence decision,
it could wait until Congress amends the NWPA to attain a higher
level of certainty. On the other hand, the NRC could set the course
for political change by calling for consolidated storage in a new
WCD Update. As an independent agency, especially one with such
technical expertise, the NRC should preemptively issue its own
conclusion on this matter. To do so, the agency will need to research
the safety and feasibility of consolidated storage management of SNF
for at least a century, as well as the transportation-related issues of
cask degradation over extended storage times. The NRC has already
made significant headway in researching and promulgating
248

See BRC Report, supra note 3, at xii.
See supra Part II.A–B.
250
BRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 37. The BRC posited that “further
legislative action would not be required . . . potentially . . . until the construction
phase.” Id.
251
Id.
249
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regulations for independent spent fuel storage installations in the
form of dry cask and dry vault storage technologies. 252 Using this
knowledge, the NRC should incorporate a formal consolidated
storage phase into the nuclear fuel cycle in the revised WCD.
C. Reprocessing: Keeping Options Open for the Future
Another alternative exists in the nuclear fuel cycle, although it
has not been pursued in the United States. “Reprocessing” is the
treatment of spent nuclear fuel to allow it to be used again in the
nuclear process. 253
Commercial reprocessing facilities abroad
currently use the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) method,
in which SNF is dissolved and chemically separated to retrieve
uranium and plutonium. 254 The preserved plutonium is used again in
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and inserted back into the reactor to
generate nuclear energy. 255 Reprocessing is able to recover ninetysix percent of SNF for new fuel, with four percent remaining as highlevel waste. 256 The remaining radioactive material would still need
to be isolated; thus, reprocessing does not eliminate the need for a
252

Id.
See Clinton Bastin, We Need to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel, and
Can Do It Safely, at Reasonable Cost, 21ST CENTURY SCI. & TECH. 10 (2008),
available
at
http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/Summer_2008/Reproces
sing.pdf (arguing that the concept of “nuclear waste” is a fiction, and that given
advanced reprocessing technologies, nuclear energy is a renewable resource).
254
Szabo, supra note 6, at 238. “Regular” SNF contains plutonium and
uranium mixed with other highly radioactive elements. The PUREX method yields
pure plutonium, which is why reprocessing is considered to pose a heightened
security risk of theft for nuclear weapons proliferation. Costs of Reprocessing
Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel: CBO Testimony Before the U.S.
Senate Subcomm. on Energy and Nat. Resources, 110th Cong. 4. (2007) (statement
of CBO Director Peter Orzsag) [hereinafter CBO Testimony]. Further research is
needed to strengthen security against proliferation. See infra notes 258–259.
255
WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013)
[hereinafter Processing of Used Fuel].
256
Bastin, supra note 253, at 12. Although there is some question as to
whether the remaining four percent should even be classified as “waste.” Id.
Bastin argues that the remaining radioactive material can be separated to yield
valuable isotopes that the U.S. currently imports for medical testing and treatment.
Id.
253
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permanent repository. However, the total amount of high-level waste
is dramatically reduced to about one-fifth of its original volume. 257
Theoretically, reprocessing can “extend[] the world’s uranium
resources almost indefinitely.” 258 While this is useful for energy
purposes, reprocessing also breaks plutonium into nonfissionable,
shorter-lived isotopes with less explosive properties than “regular”
SNF that has not been reprocessed. 259 Over time, reprocessing
significantly reduces both the volume and the radiotoxicity of nuclear
waste. 260
Despite these advantages, the United States has not embraced
commercial reprocessing because the technology has yet to become
257

Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, supra note 255.
Richard Rhodes and Denis Beller, The Need for Nuclear Power, 79
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 41 (2000). Some may wonder, why was reprocessing not
considered previously? Reprocessing is not cutting-edge research; it was first
developed during the Manhattan Project while constructing the atomic bomb. See
Szabo, supra note 6, at 235–37. At the time, reprocessing was deemed necessary
because uranium was thought to be very scarce. ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS 22542, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development
1 (2008). During the Cold War, though, reprocessing began to take on a
threatening connotation because other countries were using this technology for the
sole purpose of developing nuclear weapons. Id. at 3. In 1976, President Gerald
Ford issued a policy statement that condemned reprocessing, fearing that it would
increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. Id. The next year, President Carter
suspended all “commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium” in the United
States in an effort to curb nuclear escalation. Id. This ban was later lifted under
President Reagan, but most U.S. facilities never pursued reprocessing technology.
Id. at 5. Only in recent years has reprocessing technology been suggested in terms
of safer, cleaner, and possibly more efficient energy production.
259
Rhodes & Beller, supra note 258, at 41. Various European countries
have been researching other advanced reprocessing methods that reduce the risk of
proliferation, including the UREX method and pyroprocessing. See Processing of
Used Fuel, supra note 255. In 2006, the U.S. government created the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to collaborate with other countries on
“proliferation-resistant recycling technologies in order to produce more energy,
reduce waste and minimise proliferation concerns.” Id. The U.S. domestic
component of this program was cancelled in 2009. See International Framework
for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (July 2012),
http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf117_international_framework_nuclear_energy_cooperation.htm
l.
260
Michael Valenti, Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel a la Francaise, 117
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 76–80 (1995).
258
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cost-effective. 261 The cost-benefit analysis of reprocessing versus
disposal tends to turn on the price of uranium, and thus far, uranium
has been cheap enough to warrant disposal of SNF rather than
retrieving the uranium through reprocessing. 262 However, the United
States imports nearly all of its uranium from foreign countries, and
the average spot price has been relatively unstable. 263 Crucially, the
United States lacks special facilities that could accommodate
commercial reprocessing technology. 264 Also, some form of longterm storage is necessary to house recycled SNF. 265 For these
reasons, commercial reprocessing in the United States is not
economically feasible now or in the near future. 266
The prohibitive costs present in the commercial sector do not
signal that reprocessing should be abandoned as a scientific pursuit.
Reprocessing is the future of nuclear energy. 267 Currently, France,
the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, and India have their own
reprocessing facilities. 268 Several other European countries send
their SNF to be reprocessed at La Hague, France—the world’s largest
reprocessing facility. 269 Most of these countries have chosen to
reprocess spent fuel for reasons other than economic efficiency. 270
261

See CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6–11.
A Harvard University study from 2003 concluded that reprocessing
“will be more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price
reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium.” Matthew Bunn et al., The Economics
of Reprocessing v. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, PROJECT ON MANAGING
THE ATOM ix (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
December 2003).
263
Uranium Purchased by Owners and Operators of U.S. Civilian
INFORMATION
ADMIN.,
ENERGY
Nuclear
Power
Reactors,
U.S.
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/nuclear/umar/summarytable1.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
264
CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
However, it may be a very “distant” future. For a fuller discussion of
the prospects of nuclear reprocessing, see Szabo, supra note 6.
268
CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 5.
269
Id.
270
Radio Interview with Charles Forsberg, Executive Director of the MIT
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Project, entitled Living on Earth: Should we Recycle Spent
Nuclear
Fuel?
(Apr.
2011),
available
at
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=11-P1300013&segmentID=3.
262
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Like other major forms of energy, nuclear power relies on discrete
quantities of certain elements. Energy resources are finite, and they
must be treated as such. The environmental advantages are clear:
reprocessing preserves essential resources and reduces radioactive
byproducts of the nuclear fuel cycle by eighty percent. 271 Although
the full economic advantages have yet to be realized, reprocessing
should someday lower the costs of long-term storage (through waste
reduction) and front-end uranium mining costs. 272
Reprocessing also provides a strong case for a consolidated
storage system. Should the United States pursue this technology, it
will need monitored and retrievable SNF storage systems. 273 The
current system of geologic disposal is designed to prevent future
human contact and to deny access to these materials. 274 Burial of the
U.S. inventory of SNF, containing stocks of uranium and plutonium,
is detrimental to potential reprocessing endeavors in the future. Even
though the United States has only a limited reprocessing program
now, it should not foreclose its ability to pursue commercial
reprocessing later—whether it be within a few decades or the next
century.
In the upcoming WCD revisions, the NRC should take
nuclear reprocessing into consideration. At this point, it would be
premature to outright rely on reprocessing technology to have a
measurable impact on the amount of accumulating SNF.
Reprocessing is so early in its development, particularly in the United
States, that it cannot truly provide “reasonable assurance” in terms of
waste confidence.
However, the potential for reprocessing
technology is an important factor in formulating a waste management
plan. NRC rulemakings must contemplate long-term needs for the
industry, as well as the protection of forthcoming generations. A
safer and more competitive commercial nuclear energy program will
demand a consolidated storage system and the capability to pursue
reprocessing technology.

271

See supra text accompanying note 257.
CBO Testimony, supra note 254, at 6.
273
Id.
274
See supra note 14.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Spent nuclear fuel is a problem that will not subside or fade
out; rather, it will continue to grow at a slow, predictable rate.
Allowing this material to literally “pile up” on-site at nuclear
reactors, in the absence of a long-term solution, should be utterly
unacceptable to the public. The federal nuclear waste management
program has endured much criticism for its failure to develop a
geologic repository, but critics acknowledge that these failures were
political rather than scientific or technical errors. 275 Yet the safe
storage and disposal of nuclear waste is in everyone’s best interest.
The federal government must revise the NWPA and resolve the
funding issues in order for any aspect of the waste management
program to move forward.
As New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
demonstrated, the NRC can no longer steadfastly rely on the current
legislative scheme of the NWPA in its Waste Confidence Decision.
The NRC is capable and well-prepared to render its own
recommendation regarding waste management. Indeed, no other
agency is as familiar with commercial nuclear plants and the existing
storage situation. In light of the doubtful status of a geologic
repository, the NRC should revise the WCD to incorporate a
potential consolidated storage system into its environmental analysis
under NEPA. By doing so, the NRC offers a safer and practical
interim solution until a geologic repository is built, and integrates a
crucial phase in the fuel-cycle system to support a competitive
nuclear sector.
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See G.A.O. 11-229, supra note 44, at 11.

